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Abstract 
Since IPO waves was firstly proposed by Ibbotson& Jaffe (l975) and Ritter (1984), many scholars has analyzed it, 
combining with market timing. However, few of them used models or did empirical analysis on the basis of product 
market.  Till Chemmanur&Jie He (2009) who studied the IPO waves on the product market shows us a new approach 
to analyze IPO waves. Thus, this paper will build a modified model on product market, which takes the policy factor 
in China into consideration and gives several propositions. Moreover, based on the manufacturing firms listed in A 
share market of Shanghai and Shenzhen securities market from July of 1999 to December of 2009, we examined 
hypotheses and that whether there are IPO waves in china manufacturing or not. Besides, we solve the optimal timing 
of going public after comparing the benefit of going public and issuing cost. 
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1. Introduction  
Recently, the theoretical models that related to IPO waves came from Lubos Pastor & Pietro Veronesi 
(2005) and Alti (2005). The following scholars as Boehmer& Ljungqvis (2006) applied the former theory 
to the capital market in Germany and their results supported Lubos Pastor &Pietro Veronesi(2005). And 
Brian E.Young (2007) improved the model of Pastor& Veronesi to empirically analyze the capital market 
in the United States and they argued that the absolute level of the change on market variables have a 
stronger relationship with the IPO waves, compared with the relative level of change. Although Lubos 
Pastor & Pietro Veronesi (2005) and Alti (2005) had a different starting point and both of them considered 
capital market, they did not analyze the relationship between the IPO waves and the different 
characteristics of product market. Therefore, we will build a modified model to study market timing and 
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IPO waves on the capital market with the empirical study on the data from manufacturing firms listed in A 
share market of Shanghai and Shenzhen securities market from July of 1999 to December of 2009. 
2. Review of Literature 
Ibbotson&Jaffe (l975) firstly proposed the IPO hot market and argued that there exist cyclical 
fluctuations in the issuing volume of IPO and the average abnormal returns.  Ritter (1984) argued that the 
IPO waves in hot market that Ibbotson& Jaffe proposed really existed. Vojislav Maksimovic & Pegaret 
Pichler(2000) found that early IPO will emerge in an industry that is more mature with lower cost and Neal 
M. Stoughton,Kit Pong Wong& Josef Zechner (2001) predicted that only the firms with high quality will 
go to the public and hot market depends on the uncertain distribution of market size and consumers’ 
preference for products. Matthew Spiegel&Heather Tookes(2008) found that the bigger the size and more 
profitable of a firm, a stronger incentive to adopt a new technology and Thomas Chemmanur and Shan 
He& Debarshi Nandy(2009) analyze the manufacturing industry in the USA and found that after 
controlling venture capital and bank loans, the productivity, size and market shares of the private 
companies will affect its probability to go public. Jiri Chod&Evgeny Lyandres (2009) built a model on the 
basis of product market and found that when the industry competition gets firmer, the private firms will be 
more willing to go public and thus make an IPO waves. Chemmanur& Jie He (2009) made a comparison 
between the firms in hot and cold market and found that the company listed during the IPO waves had a 
lower productivity and profitability. However, the related literatures are mainly about debt financing, Wu 
Haoming and Wang Hua (2009) found that the short-term debt will enhance the competitiveness of firms 
in the product market. 
Based on the literature review, they rarely focus on the product market to analyze the relationship 
between the IPO waves and market timing. Therefore, this paper will do research on IPO waves from the 
perspective of product market, especially regarding the special situation in China. 
3. Model structure 
3.1 Building a model  
1) Assumptions 
On the basis of the model of Chemmanur& Jie He (2009), we added a new variable into the model and 
modified it according to specific national conditions in China. As Chemmanur& Jie He did, we suppose 
that there are only two monopoly private firms in some industry, which divided up the market shares and 
the cost of going public is B. In our model, there are time-0, time-1, time-2 and time-3.  
At time-0, we endowed the two private firms with the same internal capital and production technology 
but different productivity and market share. The firm one (F1) has a market shares m and production 
technology
1A , while the firm two (F2) has a market shares (1- m) and production technology 2A , but 1A ＞
2A  . If they both go to the public, an IPO waves will be evoked. 
At time-1, the two firms both knew that in the future time-2 that a production shock may emerge which 
make the productivity raise a AΔ  ( AΔ ＞0) with a positive probability P. After the shock, the productivity 
of the firm i is i iA =A A′ + Δ 。Besides, given the distribution of the shock, the private firm will calculate 
the optimal value of expected capital and will choose to go public when internal capital case cannot afford 
the optimal production. Moreover, going to public has two advantages: lower cost than debt financing; 
more creditworthiness to the clients and suppliers. Therefore, that’s their first run of competition.  
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At time-2, if the shock realized that the firm which didn’t go to the public can choose to do so. And this 
will bring in more raising capital and enhance its market shares and cash flows in the future. That’s their 
second run of competition.  
At time-3, they exactly know the distribution of the cash flows between the shareholders in the future 
and liquidated the value of the company. 
2)Chinese Policy Factors 
Especially in our model, we introduced a new policy factor -a threshold T - into the model. What needs 
special attention is that since China adopts approval system which makes the securities regulators have the 
right to reject the application to issue shares that fail to meet the relevant laws and the securities regulatory 
authority, and thus the approval of the securities regulators becomes the key to succeed in issuing. As a 
result, T meets several requirements as follows: 
• Threshold T represents a series of requirement which is stable from time-0 to time-3. If the firm 
satisfies those requirements (i.e., C>T), it will go public or else it failed. If the firm fails those requirements 
(i.e., C<T), it won’t go public even if it timed the market.  
• The firm which made its decision but failed to go public at time-1 won’t be able to do it again at time-
2. In China, there is policy to restrict listing that the underwriter has to do the pre-listing tutoring for at 
least 3 years, which means the next time to apply must be 3 years later. Therefore, there is risk in choosing 
the time to market at time-1. 
3.2  Equilibrium under policy constraints  
1) Possible IPO waves  
A positive probability that the shock will happen makes an IPO waves possible (P>0). Since the raising 
cost from going public is quite low relatively to the total money raised and China developed really fast, so 
it is reasonable to assume that the shock will happen with a positive probability. If the shock happened at 
time-2, F1 can enjoy a higher productivity if it chose to go public at time-1 regardless the cost or more 
market shares so it will make the decision to go public as soon as possible. As to F2, when F1 goes to the 
public, it will get worse with less market shares if F1 succeed. Since the cost is relatively small, F2 won’t 
wait and after knowing the best choice of F1, it will make the same decision as the F1 does. Therefore, in 
order to confirm one’s competitiveness in the product market, both firms will choose to go public, when 
they all succeed, an IPO waves emerges. In a word, a decision to IPO depends on several factors: the size 
and the possibility of the shock, the cost of going public and the opportunity cost, initial productivity in the 
industry and a positive possibility of the shock is necessary to make a wave. 
2) Perfect  equilibrium 
Suppose that the possible ceiling and the floor of the productivity shock are ACΔ and AFΔ , S represents 
the capacity of a firm to grab consumers on the product market per market share. We can get several 
propositions. 
Proposition 1  If the shock is medium (
1 2 CA A A< A− < Δ Δ ), P is relatively big, issuing cost B is 
relatively small and the threshold is relatively low (C1>T，C2>T)for them to achieve, moreover, F1 and 
F2 have a relatively high productivity, both of them will choose and succeed in being listed at time-1, 
which makes an IPO wave.  
When they both have a high productivity and P is big that their initial producing sizes might not be 
optimal in the future, then they will go to the public to raise money. Since the probability is big and they 
are both close to their optimal sizes with small restrictions to go public, F2 believes that F1will finally 
succeed in listing and if it doesn’t do the same, it will definitely lose market shares. Moreover, after F1 
made its decision, F2 will have a stronger incentive to go public. And the reason that F1 will delay going 
public is that if the shock happens then the revenue one company gets outweigh its cost to do so, as a result, 
one will go to the public as soon as possible to grab the market shares of the other competitor. Therefore, 
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before the shock definitely happens, these two firms have already made the decision to go public and thus 
produce an IPO wave.  
Proposition 2 If the shock is so big that CA> AΔ Δ , the threshold T will benefit the firm which has a 
bigger market shares, and two perfect equilibriums (PEs) will be obtained:  
PE (1) When the initial market shares of F1 is medium and the initial productivity of the two firms is 
relatively low, so that F1 and F2 will go to public at time-2 when the shock happens and thus evokes an 
IPO wave.  
PE (2) When the initial market shares of F1 is very small and its productivity is relatively high but the 
productivity of F2 is very low, so that F1will choose time-1 to go public while F2 only tries to do so at 
time-2 when the shock is realized. 
These can be interpreted as follows: when the latent shock AΔ falls between ACΔ  and AFΔ , their initial 
market shares decide which equilibrium will happen. In the competition of product market, the capability 
of a firm to grab market shares depends on two variables: the market shares of the rivals and its own shares 
that make it to grab the others. When AΔ falls between ACΔ  and AFΔ  and the market shares of F1 is big, if 
F1 does not go public at time-1, the revenue of F2 outweighs F1. Moreover, if F1 chose to be listed at time-
1, it is more easily to get permitted and even it does so at time-2, it can also enhance it power to grab the 
market shares of competitors. And F2 may probably have the same thought. Therefore, they both will do it 
at time-2 and PE (1) is realized. Otherwise, when the market shares of F1 is far smaller than F2, if F1 
choose IPO at time-1, it is easier for F1 to succeed with its high productivity and its ability to grab the 
market shares, which makes F1 go to public at time-1. Similarly, as the threshold being an obstacle to 
succeed, F2 tends to be listed at time-2, being afraid of failing to do so at time-1 because of his low 
productivity. On the other hand, if F1 choose not to go public at time-1 but time-2, the marker shares of F2 
will grow up. Therefore, if F1 has a strong incentive to go public at time-1, but F2 will have a strong one 
after the shock realized at time-2. When AΔ falls between ACΔ  and AFΔ , and the market shares of F1 is 
relatively small, then the PE (2) will happen. Moreover, apart from their initial market shares, their 
productivity will affect which PB will form. When F2 has so low productivity that almost it won’t have 
any motivation to go public, but F1 has a high productivity that it will choose to go public at time-1 to grab 
the market shares, regardless the threshold. This thus makes PB (2). When they both have a low 
productivity, they will wait till time-2, because the threshold will make be an obstacle to go public at time-
1. And PB (1) is obtained. 
Proposition 3 When the latent shock A<ACΔ , two equilibriums will happen but none of them will bring 
out an IPO waves, regardless what the T requires. 
       PE(3)When the probability of the shock is small and the initial market shares of F1 m is quite small, 
if the initial productivity of F1 is small with a high threshold, then when the shock is realized that F1 will 
go public at time-2 but F2 will never do so.  
PE(4) When the probability of the shock is big and the m is relatively big, but its productivity is very 
high and the cost or the risk is not small, then F1 will go to the public at time-1 but F2 will never do so.  
Suppose 1 2A<A AΔ − , and F2 will never go public, since the additional market shares is less than the 
cost, it won’t have enough incentive to go public.  Even the T is easy to achieve, after weighing the gain 
and loss, not going public is the optimal choice for F2. But for F1, after the shock is realized, only the firm 
that has a relatively high productivity will make the decision to go public. When going public becomes a 
way to raise money, F1 will go public after the shock is realized. But F2 has a low productivity and will 
not go public since it has enough capital to improve its productivity and even if it tries to do so it may 
probably fails. The low productivity of F1 means a low revenue before the shock is realized and regarding 
the big cost, F1 will probably go public at time-2 and PE (3) holds. When the issuing cost is not very 
expensive and F1 has a high productivity, then even F1 don’t have a need to raise money, it will be easier 
for F1 to go public with its advantage on productivity. Since the optimal choice of F2 is giving up going 
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public, then the sooner F1 goes public, the more market shares it will grab, which will give it  more 
capacity to win in the market. Therefore, going public at time-1 is the best choice for F1 and PE (4) holds. 
4. Empirical analysis 
4.1 Hypotheses  
Firstly, empirical hypotheses are given as follows: 
H1：After an IPO, one will get more market shares with its competitor having a descending market 
shares especially when the rivals do not go public.   
Secondly, from the former propositions, we know that the threshold T will affect the success of a 
company’s IPO so that the firm with lower productivity will not go public alone but will go public with 
firms which have high productivity in the IPO waves to grab the market shares.  
But in China, the threshold T is high, thus the lower productivity firms will more likely be turned down 
and they have to wait till the shock happens. Therefore, they will choose a fit time to go public with those 
have a higher productivity. As a result, the listed firms in the cold market have a higher productivity than 
the ones being listed in the IPO waves. In equilibriums, there is no case like F2 goes public at time-1 and 
F1 does so at time-2. Because when the shock really happens, both of the firms need to weigh the gain and 
loss from delaying an IPO. They will lose the opportunity to compete the first run of market shares but the 
revenue is only the saving of issuing cost. So, listing firms in the early of an IPO wave will have a higher 
productivity compared with a firm in the late of an IPO wave. Therefore, we make two other hypotheses: 
H2：The firm listed in a cold market has a higher productivity than the firm in an IPO wave.  
H3：The firm listed early in an IPO wave has a higher productivity than the firm later in an IPO wave.  
At last, from the H2 and H3, we can easily speculate that if initial capital, capital being raised, market 
shares after IPO and issuing cost of the two firms are the same and both satisfy the requirements of the 
threshold, then the firm listed in the cold market will be higher proficiency than the firms listed in the IPO 
waves. If they have a same market shares after IPO, then the difference of their productivity becomes the 
difference of their performance after IPO. Therefore, when other conditions are the same, the post-IPO 
performance of a firm listed in an IPO wave is worse than the firm listed in a cold market. Moreover, a 
company with a high productivity has a big need in raising money and if the capital and market shares are 
the same for them after IPO, then a firm with a high productivity will go to the public in the early time of 
an IPO wave and it performances better after IPO than the firm listed later in the wave. 
H4：The firm which goes public in the cold market will be more proficient than the one listed during an 
IPO wave.  
H5：When industry condition, the capital after IPO, market shares are given, the firm which go public 
at the early time during an IPO will have a better performance than the one listed at the later time during an 
IPO.  
4.2 Data Selection 
The data used in this paper came from Guo Taian data base and Stockstar. Since China took the 
ratification system from the July of 1999 and the data before 1999 was complete, so we choose the sample 
from July of 1999 to December of 2009. And we had to delete the period from July of 2005 to May of 
2006, because the Regulators stop approving IPO. Moreover, we classified them, mainly resource 
processing and manufacturing, and machinery and electronics manufacturing. The other variables are as 
follows: 
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a) TFP (Total Factor Productivity). According to Cobb-Douglas production function, we get TFP in 
formula (1): 
ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( )ijt jt jt ijt jt ijt jt ijt ijtY K L Mα β γ δ ξ= + + + +                           (1) 
In formula (1), i represent a firm, j represents industry and t represents year. Y is output which can be 
replaced by the cash received from sales and service. K is capital input which can be replaced by net fixed 
assets per year from the Balance sheet. L is labor input and is replaced by the cash being paid to employees. 
M is the raw material replaced by money paid in the purchase. And do regression about this Cobb-Douglas 
production function according to different years and the residual is the TFP of different years of the 
company, which can also be known as the rank of the productivity in the year of t of Fi in the industry. 
b)IPONUM is the number of IPO in a certain industry 90 days before and after a firm goes public in 
Shanghai and Shenzhen securities market, which can be used as an index to check the concentration of 
going public during a certain time. 
c)The “order” is used to check the influence of market timing in the wave to the productivity, post-IPO 
performance, and utilization of the found. In order to avoid the effect of size of the IPO waves, we divided 
the time into four parts: 0, 1, 2, 3, the bigger the number, the later the IPO.  
d) MSG (market share growth), and MS (market shares) can be used to reflect the position of a firm’s 
product in the industry, i.e. the proportion of cash paid for sales and service in the industry. MSG can be 
used to weigh whether an IPO can enhance the market shares or not, it is defined as follows:  
1log( ) log( )t t tMSG MS MS −= − ………                      ………… (2) 
e) ROA (return on assets) is an index to show the post-IPO performance, i.e. ratio of net profit before 
interest and tax at end of the year to total assets. 
f) The “cash” is used to show how the raising funds are used, which is the cash and net increase in cash 
and cash equivalents after the first year of IPO. In order to control the effect of capital size on cash, we use 
the ratio of increase in cash and cash equivalents to total assets to replace “cash”. 
4.3 Empirical Analysis 
1) The effect of IPO to market shares   
 In order to estimate the effect of IPO to market shares, we build a regression as follows: 
log( ) log( )MSG RP AP CS ageα β γ δ η ξ= + + + + +           (3) 
Since we lack the data of main business income, we use the cash of sales and service to replace the 
market shares and the increasing shares to replace MSG. RP and AP are dummy variables, which are used 
to reflect the conditions of the companies. If a company goes public 3years before the end of 2008, then 
AP is 1, or else is 0. If a company goes public 2 years before 2008, RP is 1, or else is 0. CS represents fixed 
assets, which came from the original value minus depreciation. Age means the years a company keeps 
alive since being funded. We can get the results as follows: 
MSG=0.4067+0.0497×RP+0.039×AP-0.024×log(CS)+0.0365×log (age)         (4) 
(1.489)   (0.8525)   (0.618)   (-1.618)       (1.1498) 
The coefficients of RP and AP is positive, which means an IPO will increase the market shares and the 
coefficient of RP is bigger than AP, which means that the increase in the market shares in lately listed 
firms is 1% higher than the shares of already listed ones. Absolute value of T is less than 2, which means 
the results are not statistically significant which shows that H1 do not get completely verified. 
2)The relationship between TFP, IPO waves and market timing    
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According to formula (1), we can get TFP below:  
Table 1 Mean of TFP in 2009  
 mean of TFP variance T-stat 
IPO waves 0.000309 0.089002 
0.023853 
Cold market -0.0005 0.062511 
The mean of TFP of the firms listed in the wave is higher than those listed in the cold market, which is 
inconsistent with H2. With the insignificant t-value less than 2, this difference between the two samples is 
not significant. And the comparisons between the TFP of firms which go public at different time in the 
wave are shown in the table below:  
Table 2 Mean of TFP in 2009 
 Order0 Order1 Order2 Order3 
mean of TFP -0.06603 0.126274 -0.04009 -0.05501 
Order  0-3 -0.01102 
T-stat -0.16319 
From the table above, the mean of FTP of the firms listed at the early time of an IPO wave is negative 
and is less than those listed at the later time of an IPO, which is inconsistent with H3. Moreover, their t-stat 
is less than 2 so that this difference is not significant.  
3) The difference of productivity of an IPO firm in cold and hot market 
A regression on TFP of machinery and electronics manufacturing in 2009 are as follows. We find that 
the coefficient of IPONUM is positive, which means the productivity of an IPO firm listed in the wave is 
higher than those listed in the cold market, which does not consist with H2 but this is still insignificant. 
TFP=-0.081+0.0035*IPONUM-0.0002*log (cs) +0.025*log (age) 
(-0.319)       (0.972)               (-0.017)     (0.726)     (5) 
4) The difference of TFP of IPO firms in cold and hot market 
The following is the estimation of TFP in the early time and later time during an IPO wave: 
TFP=-0.398- 0.014*order+0.009*log (cs) +0.107*log (age)  
(-0.672)  (-0.446)            (0.335)              (0.808)         (6) 
That the coefficient of Order is negative means that the later it goes public the lower productivity one 
will get. The productivity of firm listed early in the wave is higher than the firms later in the wave by 4.2% 
with the mean of 0.11%, and it is significant, which is consistent with H3. But it is not significant 
statistically, and the reasons why it is so may be that their TFPs are not different or our data is biased.  
5)The relationship of ROA, IPO waves and market timing  
Table Ⅲ depicts the mean of ROA of the first year after IPO, it shows different timing in the waves, and 
firms listed in the early of the wave has a ROA lower of 0.4% than those later in the wave. But this is not 
statistically significant that H5 is in some way verified. 
Table 3 Mean of ROA of the first year after IPO 
 Order0 Order1 Order2 Order3 
Mean of ROA 0.071 0.082 0.083 0.075 
Order0-order3 -0.004 
T-stat -0.09 
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Even though the ROA of the firms listed in wave has a better performance than those listed in cold 
market. Therefore, we made an examination as follows:  
ROA=0.063-0.0004*IPONUM+0.025*log (mc)- 0.03*log(proceeds) 
(1.13) *            (-1.33)             (6.88) *               (-6.18) * 
-0.0044*log(age)+0.025*price-0.001*IR                               (7) 
(-2.00) *              (7.05) *        (-5.53) *    
The sign * means that the coefficient is significant at 10%. Mc, proceeds, age, price and IR represents 
the market value of the first year after IPO, the money raised, the number of years a company set up, the 
bid price, and the initial rate of return of new stocks respectively. The coefficient of IPONUM is negative, 
means that the bigger the IPONUM, the smaller of ROA, which is consistent with H4. But it is not 
significant. The following is the estimation on the effect of market timing to performance of a listed firm: 
ROA=0.09-0.0002*order+0.032*log(mc)-0.038*log(proceeds) 
(-0.94)          (-0.06)           (5.52) *                       (-4.6) *    
+0.001*log(age)+0.0113*price-0.02*IR                                  (8) 
 (0.23)                  (2.01) *       (3.36) *   
The coefficient of “order” is negative and 0.06% higher than those listed later in the wave, which means 
that the sooner a firm goes public the higher ROA it will get. This is consistent with H5, but not 
statistically significant. 
4.4 The results 
According to the results, we testified that an IPO can help to increase the market shares and decrease the 
cost of raising money, but the productivity and ROA are not consistent in the theory and empirical analysis, 
it might be interpreted as follows. First, the output index cannot be completely got from sale goods. Second, 
we cannot get the financial data from private firms and thus the statistic index is biased. Third, the number 
of listed firms is not enough and thus the classification we made far from perfect. Forth, the data before 
1999 cannot be obtained and the period of the sample is short and it volatiles randomly.  
5. Summary and conclusions 
This paper modified the model in Chemmanur& Jie He (2009) regarding the policy factor in China on 
the basis of IPO waves in the product marker and market timing, and our model shows that to two firms 
with different productivity, when there is threshold for approval and a positive production shock, IPO 
waves might be equilibrium under the pressure of competition in product market. We also estimate the IPO 
waves in the manufacturing industry in China from July of 1999 to December of 2009 by comparing the 
productivity, performance of the listed firms before and after their IPO, utilization of funds of the firms 
within the industry and we show  the IPO waves and market timing in China.  
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